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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
JOSEPH JUDKIXS, D_A_X J. ~IILLER, 
FRANK OBORN, and ... \DRI.:~N DE BLOOIS, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
BOYD N. FRONK, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 7600 
We are of the opinion that a Reply Brief may he 
helpful to the court in- this case. 
The case of National Lumber Products Company 
vs. Ponzio, N.J., 42 Atl. (2) 753, cited by respondents 
at page 12 of their Brief is not in point. This is a case 
, 
in which the plaintiff installed a planing machine in a 
lumber yard which was already a non-conforming use. 
Therefore it is a case of increasing an already non-
conforming use and not one where a use was authorized 
at the time of issuance of a permit and a subsequent 
ordinance enacted prohibiting the use. Also it appeared 
that plaintiff could have had lumber planed outside of 
his yard with very little delay so that his filling war 
contracts would not be materially affected. 
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Respondents a.t page 12 of their brief cite the case 
of Wilkins vs. San Bernardino et al Calif. (1946) 175 
Pac.. (2) 542. In tha.t case the property owner deliber-
ately violated the zoning ordinance by building a multi-
ple dwelling and therefore the court denied relief in a 
declaratory judgment action. The court, however, at 
page 551 la.ys down a principle of law which supports 
the appellant's contention in the case a.t bar. There 
the court says : 
''The fact that there- is a housing shortage 
might justify the city, or perhaps even the court, 
under proper conditions, in te·mporarily suspend-
ing the operation of the zoning ordinance dur-
ing an emergency, but it furnishes no justifi-
cation for a judicial decision voiding the oper-
ation of the ordinance for all time to come or for 
plaintiffs action in violating the ordinance.'' 
Cases are cited in support of the· proposition 
that the· local body or In proper cases the 
court, may in time of war emergency suspend the opera-
tion of an ordinance·. Among the cases cited is that of 
City of San Diego vs. Van Winkle, 158 Pac. (2) 
77 4, (Calif.) 1945. This was an action by the City of 
San Diego to enjoin defendants from violating the City 
zoning- ordinance·. From that portion of the judgment 
which suspended during the war emergency the en-
forcement of the injunction which forever enjoined de-
fendants from occupying or permitting any person to 
occupy the duplex dwelling on defendant '-s property, 
the City appealed and the District Court of Appeal of 
California affirmed such judgment so suspending that 
portion of the injunction. Defendants were the owners 
of real property located in LaJ olla in the City of San 
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Diego. It "?as ~i tua ted in a zone where only single 
family d\Ye lling·s could be erected. In February of 
194~, the defendant8 "?ithout intention to violate the 
ordinance, eommenrPd the preetion of a duplex dwelling 
house and subsequently completed it. The apartments 
"·ere occ.upied by officer8 in the armed forces on active 
duty. It appeared and the eourt took judicial notice 
of the OYtlrcro,vded conditions existing in the San Diego 
area and of the \Yar emergency. It \Vas argued by the 
plaintiff that its zoning· ordinances a.re an exercise of 
police power and if they are not arbitrary, discrimina-
tory nor oppressive the courts must enforce them and 
that the trial court had no jurisdiction to either refuse 
or to stay an injunction. The defendants admitted 
such rules generally but argued that the war emergency 
and the housing shortage permitted a court in exer-
cising its equity jurisdiction to suspend the operation 
of the ordinance during the war emergency. This con-
tention was upheld by the court in this case. The court 
further pointed out that the rent regulations, which 
were a part of the Emergency Price Control Act and 
hence a part of the emergency war legislation and regu-
lations, would prevent eviction of the tenants and tha.t 
the defendants could not obey both the state and federal 
regulations. The court held that regulations passed 
under constitutional authority suspend state or local 
laws or regulations in conflict with them and that this 
doctrine is not new. Many cases are cited by the court 
so holding. The court held the case squarely within 
the rule announced in the case of Realty Revenue Cor-
poration vs. Wilson 182 Misc. 552, 50 N.Y.S. (2) 941, 
942, which was a New York case in which the Realty 
Revenue Corporation owned an apartment house in the 
a· 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
C_ity of New York which apartment house did not con-
form to the health and safety laws. The Commissioner 
of Housing and Buildings of the City of New York re-
quired the owner to cause the- building to be vacated 
a.s unfit for human habitation and dangerous to life and 
health by reason of defects consisting of failure to pro-
vide a sprinkling system, an interior fire alarm system 
and self-closing fireproof doors. The owner brought 
the action to enjoin the Commissioner from enforcing 
the order. It developed that the War Production Board 
had refused to give a priority to the owner for mater-
ials necessary to make the required changes so the 
owner was unable to make the building safe and to 
conform with the requirements of the law. The Supreme 
Court of New York adopted certain portions of the 
opinion of the Trial Judge from which the following 
is quoted by the California Court at page 778 of 158 
Pac. Rep. ( 2) as follows : 
''Contrary to what perhaps may be a popular 
impression, the constitutionality of law depends, 
not upon abstract theory or philosophy but upon 
a very practical application of laws to facts, and 
a statute which is valid as to one set of facts 
may be invalid as to another, and one which is 
valid when enacted may become invalid by change 
in the conditions to which it is applied. Nash-
ville, C. & St. L. Ry vs. Walters, 294 U. S. 405, 
414, 415, 55 S. Ct. 486, 79 L. ed. 949; Municipal 
Gas Co. of City of Albany vs. Public Service Com-
mission, 2 District, 225 N.Y. 89, 95, 96, 121 N.E. 
772, 773, 77 4). Owners of multiple dwellings 
may he subjected to uncompensated obedience 
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to many reg-ulation~ \Yhich are costly and burden-
some to them but to enforce against them regu-
lations "·hirh the Federal government says they 
~hall not comply \Yith "?ould be an unreasonable 
and unconstitutional deprivation of their rights. 
State commands and Federal prohibitions cannot 
be allo,Yed to become upper and nether mill-
stones bet\Yeen "Thich the rights of citize11s are 
gTound to bit~ ... The Commissioner will not be 
stayed if " .. alls, floors and ceilings are falling 
do\vn or if unsanitary conditions make disease 
imminent. It thus may be that if inability to 
g·et materials eontinues for a long period, there 
may come a time when owners of such dwellings 
will have to submit to having them vacated. Upon 
the papers now presented it does not appear 
that that point has been reached in this case ... 
The State's statutory standards stands upon the 
statute books capable of enforcement whenever 
and wherever the Federal prohibition does not 
interfere, but while the Federal prohibition con-
tinues, and in those cases to which it applies, 
the State's Statutory standard remains in sus-
pended animation.'' 
It was concluded by the New York court that as the 
apartment house was reasonably safe, the Commissioner 
of Housing and Building of the City of New York 
should he enjoined from enforcing the ordeT to vacate 
the building ''during the present emergency or until 
such time as the War Production Board releases the 
required materials.'' The California court in the San 
Diego case reached a conclusion that the trial court was 
not guilty of any breach of discretion in suspending 
the execution of. the injunction during the present wal' 
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emergency and the existing housing shortage in San 
Diego and that he was fully justified in exercising· his 
equitable powers in so doing. 
Respondents in their brief say that appellant was a 
carpenter and kne-w there were shortages of materials 
and a priority was necessary in the years 1943, 1944, 
and 1945. It is true that appellant was a carpenter. 
However, we submit that there is no evidence in the 
record from which a conclusion can be drawn that ap-
pellant knew of the necessity for priorities at the time 
he obtained his city permit. On c.ross examination of 
the appellant by Mr. Adams (Tr. 65 and 66) the follow-
ing questions and answers were given: 
'' Q. Calling your attention to the year of 1943 
and 4 and 5, you are acquainted with the fact 
during those years that there was a priority on 
building materials~ 
A. I don't recall when the priorities started. 
There was some shortages and priority. 
Q. Do you remember it being said in this hear-
ing or agreed to that in 1942 the War Production 
Board was given authority to ~ation and control 
the use of building material. Do you remember 
that being agreed to here~ 
A. Yes, I guess so. I didn't remember reading it. 
Q. Well, do you remember that during the time 
shortly before the issuance of this first permit 
that there wa.s a priority on building mate rails~ 
A. No, I don't. I don't really know whether 
there was or not. 
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Q. Well, do you remember that there was a 
scarcity of materials during that time for con-
struction "'"ork of all kinds' 
A. There may haYe been. Of course I worked for 
the g·overnment and "rasn 't acquainted with try-
ing to get them then. 
Q. I think that's all the questions I have." 
Consequently we cnnnot agree with the statement of 
counsel nor the finding of the court with respect to 
appellant's knowledge of priorities and shortages at 
the time he obtained his p.ermit. 
Respondents in their discussion of their point desig-
nated number A commencing at p.age 14 of their brief, 
contend that the City had no authority to issue a per• 
mit in exception to the ordinance. It is not contended 
by appellant that the City had the power to gr,ant an 
exception to a zoning ordinance. What ap·pellant af-
firms is that no question of exception to the ordinance 
is here involved. .LL\..ppellant obtained his building per-
mit when the ordinances of Ogden City permitted erec- · 
tion of a gasoline filling station on the .site· of his p·rop-
erty. By relying upon that permit, doing work there-
under and expending large sums pursuant thereto, ap-
pellant obtained a vested right to complete his construc-
tion which vested right could not be a.ffeced by a sub ... 
sequent amendment of the zoning ordinance. Because 
he was prevented from obtaining necessary materials 
because of Federal law and the War emergency, he did 
not lose his vested right because of inability to comply 
with the time provisions in the permit. Never having 
lost his vested right in his original p·ermit and it not 
having become void by lapse of time for the reasons 
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above set forth and set forth in his brief, appellant's 
original permit remained in force and effect and con-
sequently there was no necessity for issuing a new 
permit and no reason for attempting to grant any ex-
ception to the zoning ordinance enacted subsequent to 
the issuanee of his permit, and consequently there is no 
question in this case of an exception to the zoning ordi-
nance. It is clear from the evidence that appellant 
sought no exception to the zoning· ordinance but that 
he asked the City C.ommis·sion for a renewal of his 
original permit. Inasmuch as appellant does not con-
tend that the· City had any power to grant an exception 
to a zoning ordinance and that such question is not 
involved in this case, the numerous cases cited and 
discussed by respondents in their brief on this question 
have no application to the case at bar. 
It is alleged by respondents in their complaint ili 
paragraph seven thereof, that 
''On October 13, 1948 the appellant appeared 
before- •the Board of Commissioners of Ogden 
City Corporation and requested a permit which 
he purchased three years ago be renewed, said 
permit being for the erection of a service station 
at 20th Street on Harrison Boulevard.'' 
This was the only application before the City Commis-
sion and was the application acted upon by the Com-
mission. Respondents futher allege in paragraph seven 
of their complaint 
''That on October 21, 1948 the following communi-
cation was addressed to the Board of Commissioners 
by C. R. Kimball, said Engineer. 
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'Subjeet: ... \pplication for building permit at-
tached hereto. Application made by B. M. Fronk 
to ronstruc.t a se rYiee station on the Northeast 
corner of Harrison Boulevard and 20th Street. 
_Jir. Fronk recently appeared before the Com-
mission asking· that an old permit be renewed 
for this eonstruction. The· action taken by the 
Commission at that time approved the renewal 
of the permit" provided there were no protestants 
within a 'Yeek. That period has elapsed and the 
application i~ being· submitted for your approval. 
Respectfully submitted · 
by C. R. Kimball' 
That on October 26, 1948, the above communication was 
presented to the Board of City Commissioners and the 
same "'"as moved by Mayor Peery, seconded by Thomas 
East and voted on by Mayor Peery, Thomas East and 
Ed. T. Saunders.'' 
These allegations in respondents' complaint with 
respect to the application for renewal of the permit 
and the action taken by the City Commission are ad-
mitted by paragraph seven of appellant's answer. Hence 
it is alleged and admitted in the pleadings that the appli-
cation was for renewal of permit and the action of the 
Board of City Commissioners was to grant renewal 
of the original permit. Statements made by either 
the Mayor or the City Engineer a.s to an exception to 
the ordinance had no legal effect because both under 
the pleadings of the parties and as shown by the ex-
hibits containing the communications to thH City Com-
mission, it is clear that the matter before the Commis-
sion was the matter of application for renewal and not 
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an application for the issuance of a new permit in ex-
eeption to the zoning ordinance of August, 1946. These 
allegations in the complaint and admissions made by 
the appellant's answer are further substantiated by 
the direct testimony of the appellant. ( Tr. 56) 
''A. I figured I had to have a renewal of the 
permit to go ahead. 
Q. And what did you do about it~ 
A. 1 went down and asked for a renewal of ID) 
permit. 
Q. You went down where~ -·· 
A. To the City Commission. 
Q. And what did the City Commission do in re-
lation to it~ 
A. They ruled I ·should. 
A. I told the City Commission how I wanted to 
renew the permit to go ahead with the building 
becau.se I had been unable to get materials before 
and had been shut off and wanted to go ahead." 
It may not have heen necessary for the appellant 
to ask for renewal of his pe·rmit since his vested right 
had not been lost therein. However, if it were neces-
sary to seek renewal under the circumstances, then the 
renewal by the Board of Commissioners was not in ex-
ception to the zoning ordinance of August 1946, but was 
a renewal of a validly existing permit issued prior to 
the ·ordinance of August, 1946, and at a. time when it 
was permitted under the zoning ordinances to build a 
service station in the locality in question. Respondents 
10 
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quote the case of Walton Ys. TTaey Loan & Trust Com-
pany 97 Utah ~49, 92 Par. (2) 724, as an authority for 
the .proposition that only the Board of Adjustment has 
authority to g-rant exeeptious to zoning· ordinance-s. The 
exceptions in that case held to be within the- power of 
the Board of Adjustment to make, are minor excep-
tions such as Ya.rianre of side lines and height of build-
ing. This court in the Walton case clearly held that 
the Board of Adjustment had no power whatever to 
grant major exceptions; and specifically held that a 
Board of Adjustment has no power to grant an exception. 
allowing· a. change of use of property. The appellant did 
not seek here an exception to the zoning ordinance and if 
he had sought -an exception, it would he pertaining to 
the use of his property and the Board of Adju-stment 
in any event would have had no power to decide his 
matter. 
Respo:n,dents on page four of their brief, call atten-
tion to the fact that the appellant obtained tanks and 
pipe of which there was a critical shortage. Appellant 
calls attention to the fact that the two tanks which he 
obtained for the storing of gasoline in connection with 
the service -station were loaned to him by Wasatch Nor-
them Oil Company who had them in their possession 
at that time. ( Tr. 43, 51) 
The respondents cite the case of Pe-al vs. Gulf Red 
Cedar Co. of California, 59 Pac. (2) 182, in which it is 
held that abandonment is made up of act and intent and 
the intent must be gathered from facts and circum-
stance in the c.ase. The appellant contends that the test-
imony clearly shows that he never intended to abandon 
the building of the station after he started with its. con-
11 
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struction. The facts also show that he purchased the 
ground for the- purpose· of erecting· a service station 
thereon (Tr. 30) and that a short time after he had 
leveled the ground for the purpose of preparing to 
c.onstruct a station there, he installed, by burying in 
the ground, two large gasoline tanks which he has never 
remove-d and which now are still in place in the ground. 
These fac.ts, together with all of his other acts in obtain-
ing and seeking rna terials and applying for priorities, 
all clearly show that appellant never intended to aban-
don the construction of the service station. 
The action taken herein by the Board of Commis-
sioners of Ogden City in renewing appellant's- permit 
should be sustained. It was an exercise of their pro-
per powers after they had made a through investigation 
and after hearings and due deliberation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
SAMUEL C. POWELL 
614 David Eccles Building, 
Ogden, Utah 
DERRAH B. VAN DYKE 
502 David Eccles Building, 
Ogden, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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